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Abstract: This paper investigates a dataset that codes key features of the competition laws 
of 102 countries.  It first compares the scope of the laws overall, and of various 
subcomponents such as the law governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers.  
The second question examined in this paper is whether competition law has any effect on 
the intensity of competition within a nation.  We find, in ordinary least squares 
regressions, that the scope of a country’s competition law is positively associated with the 
perceived intensity of competition in the country’s economy.  However, we find no 
evidence that the scope of competition law is positively associated with an objective 
proxy of the intensity of competition.  Moreover, instrumental variables regressions, 
though preliminary, do not indicate that the scope of competition law affects the 
perceived intensity of competition.
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Since the early studies of Harberger,1 Stigler,2 and Posner3 there has been an interest in 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of antitrust law in securing its goals.4  That there 
have been relatively few such studies is attributable to the lack of useful statistical 
information on the law, enforcement policies, and penalties.  
 
This paper presents an effort to use information on competition laws around the world to 
assess the scope and effectiveness of the law.  The foundation of this study is a dataset 
that codes key features of the competition laws of 102 countries.5  The paper first 
compares the scope of the laws overall, and for various subcomponents such as the law 
governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers.  The second question examined in 
this paper is whether a nation’s competition law has any effect on the intensity of 
competition within its borders. 
 
Coding information on the law permits us to compare competition law regimes according 
to a fixed though somewhat arbitrary metric.  Moreover, it allows us to summarize a rich 
array of information from more than 100 countries in compact form.  Key to our 
approach is the construction of “scope indexes” to measure the breadth of the overall 
competition law and that of various subparts, such as the law on dominance or on 
mergers.  The indexes provide quantitative measures of the size of the overall 
“competition law net” in a country, or the various smaller nets designed to cover specific 
                                                 
1 Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1954). 
2 George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1966). 
3 Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970). 
4 For a single volume that contains many empirical studies of antitrust see THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. 
Shugart II eds., 1995) [hereinafter McChesney].  In 2003, the Journal of Economic Perspectives published 
a debate on the effectiveness of antitrust law.  See Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 
17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003); Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve 
Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2003).  For additional commentary on 
the JEP debate see GREGORY J. WERDEN, THE EFFECT OF ANTITRUST POLICY ON CONSUMER WELFARE: 
WHAT CRANDALL AND WINSTON OVERLOOK, (AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Regulatory Studies ed., 
Apr. 2004) (available http://aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=933).  The most recent 
empirical studies attempt to assess the impact of competition law using data from a broad sample of 
countries.  See Bernard Hoekman & Hiau Looi Kee, Imports, Entry and Competition Law as Market 
Disciplines (Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network) (available 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=392682); Michael Krakowski, Competition Policy Works: The Effect of 
Competition Policy on the Intensity of Competition - An International Cross-Country Comparison (Sept. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social Science Research Network) (available 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=854908); Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Competition Policy - Cross-
Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Social 
Science Research Network) (available http://ssrn.com/abstract=925794).  For region-specific empirical 
studies see Russell W. Pittman, Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of Central and Eastern European 
Competition Laws: Have Fears of Over-Enforcement Been Borne Out? 27 WORLD COMP. 245 (2004); 
Maria Coppola Tineo & Russell W. Pittman, Abuse of Dominance Enforcement under Latin American 
Competition Laws (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with Social Science Research Network) 
(available http://ssrn.com/abstract=888186). 
5 Keith N. Hylton, Sean Miller, and Nicola Leiter, Antitrust Around the World Database, Boston University 
Law School, August 2006. 
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subject matters.  The quantitative measures could be treated as measures of “antitrust 
risk” within each country and region examined.   
 
These comparative assessments would be quite difficult to do using a purely descriptive 
approach toward the law.  Indeed, we are inclined to argue that the primary goal of this 
paper is to encourage the gathering of statistics on the law of competition, its 
enforcement procedures, and its penalty provisions.  As a theoretically and doctrinally 
top-heavy field, the time has long passed for antitrust law to be subjected to empirical 
analysis. 
 
The first part of this study examines the variation in the scope of competition laws around 
the world.  With 102 countries, we have presented much of our comparative analysis on 
the basis of regions (North America, South America, EU Europe, etc).  In terms of 
overall scope, the strongest regions are predictably North America and EU Europe.  If the 
scope of EU competition law is determined on the basis of national competition statutes, 
EU Europe follows closely behind the North America region.  If, on the other hand, the 
scope of EU law is determined on the basis of EU Treaty law, EU Europe is by far the 
strongest region in the world.  The weakest regions are South America and Central 
America.  However, there are detailed results that sometimes go against predictions based 
on intuition or common information.  For example, Central America, while overall weak, 
is one of the stronger regimes in terms of collusive practices – the parts deemphasized 
there are mergers and monopoly abuse. 
 
The second part of the paper uses a measure of the overall scope of the country’s 
competition law (Scope Index) to determine whether the size of a country’s competition 
law net is associated with the intensity of competition in that nation’s economy.  We use 
two variables as proxies for the intensity of competition.  One, a subjective measure, is 
the World Economic Forum’s survey measure of the perceived intensity of local 
competition.6  The WEF’s survey measure runs from a low of 1 (perception that 
competition is limited) to 7 (competition is perceived as intense).  The other variable, an 
objective proxy, is the Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate. 
 
We find evidence, in ordinary least squares regressions, that the scope of a country’s 
competition law is positively associated with the perceived intensity of local competition.  
Specifically, a one point increase in the Scope Index, our measure of the law’s scope, is 
associated with a .02 increase in the WEF’s Competition Intensity survey measure, which 
appears to be equivalent in impact to the effect of increasing a country’s per capita GDP 
by $1000. 
 
We also examine the effects of various components of competition law, such as the law 
on dominance, restrictive trade practices, mergers, and penalties.  Our regressions suggest 
that increasing the range of remedies available to enforcement authorities has the largest 
                                                 
6 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2004, at 506; World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 2003, at 623.  The competition intensity survey measure is defined as follows: 
Intensity of Local Competition: Competition in the local market is (1=limited in most industries and price-
cutting is rare, 7 = intense in most industries as market leadership changes over time).  
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impact on perceived competition intensity.  We find no evidence that increasing the scope 
of merger or dominance law increases perceived competition intensity – indeed, there is 
weak evidence that increasing the scope of dominance law reduces the intensity of 
competition. 
 
Of course, given the subjective nature of the proxy for competition intensity,7 as well as 
causation issues, this evidence should be taken as tentative or preliminary at best.  In 
addition, we find no evidence that increasing the scope of a country’s competition law 
has an impact on our objective proxy for competition intensity, PPP.8  Of course, this 
could be interpreted as evidence that PPPs are simply poor proxies of the effect of 
competition intensity on prices. 
 
There are serious causation or endogeneity issues that suggest that the estimates of the 
impact of the Scope Index, based on ordinary least squares regressions, are biased.  The 
least squares estimates in the regressions that use the subjective proxy are based on an 
assumption that the scope of the law influences the perceived intensity of competition 
and is not itself simultaneously influenced by the perceived intensity of competition.  
This is a questionable assumption in the context of competition law. 
 
In view of these issues, we ran instrumental variables regressions, which avoid the bias 
due to endogeneity, in order to see if the statistically significant impact of the law’s scope 
could be replicated within that framework.  However, the instrumental variable 
regressions fail to show a statistically significant impact for the law’s scope.  
 
Part II describes the coding procedure used for this study.  Part III provides a statistical 
and visual summary of global competition regimes.  Part IV presents a statistical analysis 
of the effects of competition laws. 
 
II. Coding Competition Law 
 
The foundation of this study is an attempt to code the competition laws of 102 countries.9  
In order to do this, we developed a template, based on the approach taken by Michael 
Nicholson.10  An example of the template appears in appendix Table A1, which presents 
our attempt to code the competition laws of New Zealand.   
 
In order to construct the template, we listed the types of conduct generally prohibited 
under competition laws, the types of penalties that might be assessed under the laws, and 
the procedures for enforcing those laws.  Following Nicholson’s method,11 we divided 
                                                 
7 In defense of the subjective measure, we could argue that perception is probably accurate in most cases, 
and may be just as important as the “real” level of competition intensity.  Perception, rather than reality, 
will drive the strategies adopted by firms. 
8 Other studies that have attempted to assess the impact of competition law on objective measures have 
failed to find a statistically significant impact.  See Hoekman and Voigt, supra note 4. 
9 See Appendix, Table A4 infra pp. 57-59. 
10 Michael W. Nicholson, Quantifying Antitrust Regimes (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
Social Science Research Network) (available http://ssrn.com/abstract=531124). 
11 Id. 
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the law into several key categories: Territorial Scope, Remedies, Private Enforcement, 
Merger Notification, Merger Assessment, Dominance, and Restrictive Trade Practices.  
Our classification system differs from that of Nicholson only in the Merger Assessment 
category, where we included information on “public interest” tests used in some merger 
statutes (see appendix Table A1).  We searched each country’s competition statute to 
determine whether the prohibition or procedure is included within the country’s law, 
which generates the second and third columns of Table A1. 
 
In some cases, the country’s competition statute revealed too little information about 
prohibited conduct to be useful as the sole source of information.  The most famous 
example is the United States, which has the Sherman Act at the foundation of its 
competition laws.  The core of the Sherman Act consists of two short provisions; Section 
1, governing cartels, and Section 2, governing monopolies (or dominant firms).  In these 
cases we examined common law and other reports to fill in the template.  However, most 
countries have their competition laws codified in a statute or series of statutes. 
 
Since competition laws are changing all the time, we were forced to restrict our time 
period for constructing the templates.  The information we have coded covers the time 
period January 2001 to December 2004.  Changes in competition law that occurred after 
December 2004 are not reflected in this study.  In some cases, a country’s law changed 
between 2001 and 2004.  When this occurred, we filled out two (or more) templates to 
reflect the different regimes within a particular country during the time period of our 
sample.   Ideally, a study such as this would attempt to code for the status of each 
country’s competition law for each time period of its existence.  This would generate a 
sample running from 1889, the date Canada’s competition law was enacted, to the 
present.  Given our limited time period, this study should be viewed as a preliminary or 
provisional attempt to lay the groundwork for a much larger project. 
 
This is, admittedly, a crude attempt to code the law.  The template does not permit us to 
code for detailed differences in the competition laws among countries.  For example, 
predatory pricing is, as a matter of formal law, prohibited in both United States and the 
European Union.  However, the detailed common law reflects important differences 
between the two regimes.  The Brooke Group test has erected an extremely difficult 
evidentiary burden for predation plaintiffs in the U.S., requiring them to show that price 
is below some proxy for marginal cost and that the defendant had a strong likelihood of 
recouping its predatory investments.12  European predation law, however, does not 
include a recoupment test, and sets up a presumption of unlawful predation if price is 
below some proxy for marginal cost.13  The practical result is that although predation is 
prohibited by the competition laws of both Europe and the U.S., predation plaintiffs 
expect to lose in the U.S. while they are not so pessimistic in Europe. 
                                                 
12 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 240-242 (1993); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-598 (1986). 
13 See, e.g., Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. II-755, 4 C.M.L.R. 726 (1997), 
aff’d C-333/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-5951, 4 C.M.L.R. 662 (1997); Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. 
Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359; see also, John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 THE ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL F244, F248 (June 2005). 
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Another shortcoming of the template in Table A1 is that it includes categories that may 
overlap with other categories.  For example, the list of prohibited types of conduct for 
dominant firms includes “abusive acts” and “obstacles to entry”.  In most competition 
law regimes, the creation of an obstacle to entry by a dominant firm is simply a type of 
abusive act.  Given this, we treated the abusive act line of the template as a catch-all that 
includes within it some of the more specific types of conduct included in the dominance 
portion of the template. 
 
Yet another potential source of error is that the statutes are sometimes poorly written or 
written in such general terms that it is difficult to infer precisely what is prohibited.  For 
example, a statute that prohibits “abusive acts” by dominant firms may or may not 
prohibit predatory pricing.  As we noted earlier, we attempted to patch these cases by 
referring to case law or reports on enforcement.  However, this is bound to result in some 
inconsistencies. 
 
We attempted to minimize distortions created by the foregoing list of potential flaws by 
creating a set of definitions and attempting, as much as possible, to remain consistent 
with those definitions in coding the law.14  In the end, we are unable to say whether our 
categories and their associated definitions are optimal.   Perhaps an optimal coding 
system would not assume, as we do here, that the category “abusive acts” may contain 
other specified acts, such as creating “obstacles to entry”, as special cases.  Some 
inconsistencies probably have resulted from our efforts use a set of fixed definitions to 
code the law, but this is unavoidable in any such effort. 
 
For the most part the codes consist of 0 or 1, where 0 means that we could not find any 
provision in the law governing the specified conduct, penalty, or enforcement procedure.  
The key exception is found in the codes for merger notification regime.  Some 
competition law regimes require notification while others simply permit or encourage 
notification15 – this is the distinction between mandatory and voluntary merger 
notification.  In addition, some competition law regimes require notification before the 
merger takes effect, and others permit notification after the merger takes effect.16  There 
are four types of merger notification regime: mandatory premerger, voluntary premerger, 
mandatory postmerger, and voluntary postmerger.  We chose a set of numbers that would 
rank the different merger notification regimes according to their restrictiveness.  In terms 
of restrictiveness, we assumed the regimes should be ranked in the following order (from 
most to least restrictive): mandatory premerger, mandatory postmerger, voluntary 
premerger, voluntary postmerger.  The numerical codes used for the merger notification 
portion guarantee this ranking of regimes.17 
                                                 
14 See Appendix, Index Definitions infra pp. 61-65. 
15 For examples see Id. 
16 For examples see Id. 
17 For the individual country templates, we used the following values: mandatory = 3, voluntary =1, 
premerger = 2, postmerger = 1.  With these values, mandatory-premerger = 5, mandatory-postmerger = 4, 
voluntary-premerger = 3, and voluntary-postmerger = 2.  For computing the index measuring the scope of 
the law, we reduced each of these scores by one, so that the ranking of merger notification regimes 
increases by one-digit increments from 0 (no requirements) to 4 (mandatory-premerger). 
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Instead of coding the law from national competition statutes, there is the alternative of 
coding law that takes into account the effects of regional treaties, the most important of 
which is the European Union Treaty.  Because of the Treaty, member states of the 
European Union have a dual competition law regime.  Competition disputes that are 
relatively large, in the sense that they affect trade among EU states, are resolved under 
EU law.18 Competition disputes that are relatively small are resolved under the national 
competition statute.  This means that in a practical sense there are two sets of competition 
law in every EU member state, one for big firms and one for small firms. 
 
Even for large firms that conduct trade among EU member states, EU law is not the sole 
source of competition law that concerns them.  Although EU law has a largely 
preemptive effect in the area of mergers, dominant firms, and restrictive trade practices; 
the EU will allow the member state to apply its own law with respect to an abuse of 
dominance if that law is more stringent than that of the EU.19  In addition, the key area in 
which the EU law is not preemptive is that of private rights.  Private enforcement is 
largely determined by the national competition statute.  Specifically, whether an 
individual can sue for an antitrust violation and collect damages is a matter of the 
individual EU member-state’s competition statute.20  The appendix presents two 
completed templates for Belgium.  The first one (Appendix Table A2) is based entirely 
on Belgium’s competition statute.  The second merges Belgium’s law with that of the 
European Union.  
 
III. Variation in Competition Laws 
 
In this section, we present a statistical and visual summary of the regional differences and 
variation in competition law regimes.  The reason for examining regional differences is 
that they communicate a rough snapshot of the variation across regimes without 
burdening the reader with details on the competition laws of more than 100 countries.  In 
addition, comparison of regional differences could be of value to a firm that operates 
regionally and has to assess the degree of “antitrust risk” in its area of operation. 
 
We are aware of some of the drawbacks of the regional approach to comparisons.  One 
appears in the case of Europe.  We have divided the Europe sample into EU Europe and 
non-EU Europe.  EU Europe consists, in this sample, of the 15 countries that were 
members during most of the time period of this sample, 2001- 2004 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), plus the ten additional countries that were 
awaiting admission into the EU for most of this period and became members in May 
2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, The Modernization of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis of the Commission’s Proposal for a New Council Regulation Replacing Regulation No. 
17, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1655, 1656 (2001).  
19 See, e.g., William M. Hannay, Transnational Competition Law Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, 20 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 287, 291 (2000). 
20 CLIFFORD A. JONES, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE EU, UK AND USA 46 (1999). 
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Slovakia, and Slovenia).  We decided to include the ten countries awaiting admission in 
the EU sample because these countries had strong incentives to bring their law into line 
with EU law during the waiting period. 
 
Another problem with the EU Europe category, noted before, is that the competition law 
of each of the EU countries falls under a general framework provided by the EU treaty.    
In general, EU law applies to matters that affect trade among the member states – in other 
words, undertakings by big firms trading across state borders.  This means that the 
national laws are to some extent preempted, especially in the area of “restrictive trade 
practices,” which includes collusive conduct. 
 
Obviously, a study of the laws declared in the national statutes of European countries 
fails to reflect the preemptive effect of EU law.  On the other hand, the case for using 
information from the statutes of individual EU nations is that the individual statutes 
probably reflect domestic priorities.  Although EU law applies to the big transnational 
matters in every member state, the zeal with which a particular state’s competition 
authority enforces EU competition law may be better reflected by the scope of that state’s 
competition statute.  A country with a national statute that prohibits relatively few 
potentially anticompetitive acts has revealed a preference for a laissez-faire competition 
regime.  That preference is likely to be reflected in that country’s attentiveness toward 
enforcing EU competition law. 
 
Given the choice in the case of the European Union between coding information from 
national competition statutes and EU competition law, we have chosen to present 
information from both.  We will present comparative results based entirely on national 
competition statutes, as well as results that incorporate EU competition law.   
 
That is not as simple as merely coding for a common set of laws for all 25 EU members.  
For member states, EU law preempts some parts of the law, gives states options with 
respect to some parts, and opts for state law in other contexts.  Specifically, EU law 
preempts the substantive law regarding restrictive trade practices.  For restrictive-trade-
practice disputes that come within the jurisdiction of the European Commission, 
individual member states are not free to apply rules that deviate from EU law.21  With 
respect to dominance, member states are permitted to apply the law of their national 
statutes if that law is more restrictive than that of the EU.22  Of course, as a practical 
matter, the EU’s law is the most restrictive.  Finally, with respect to private rights of 
action, the law of the individual member state controls.23 
 
A. Measuring the Scope of Competition Law 
 
1. Scope Index 
 
                                                 
21 Council Regulation 1/2003 of December 16, 2002, Regarding the Implementation of Competition Rules 
Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, art. 3(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 8. 
22 Id. 
23 See Wils, supra note 18. 
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The first charts we present show Scope Index scores.  These scores are found by summing 
the total points within each country template, and then subtracting off the defense scores.  
To give an example, return to the template for New Zealand.  The Scope Index score for 
New Zealand is found by summing the numerical values in the template shown in Table 
1, and then subtracting off scores associated with defenses (and one point to reduce the 
merger subtotal).  In the case of New Zealand, there are three defenses (merger public 
interest defense, efficiency defense for dominant firms, efficiency defense for restrictive 
trade practices).  The sum of the points is 19 (after reducing the merger subtotal), and 
after subtracting 3, the Scope Index for New Zealand is 16.  For each European Union 
member state, an alternative Scope Index was computed based on EU law.24 
 
The point of the Scope Index is to measure the size of the competition law net in every 
country.  As the score increases, so does the size of the net.  Alternatively, one can think 
of the Scope Index for a particular country as a measure of the number of ways in which 
a firm could run afoul of the competition laws in that country.  However, the Scope Index 
score does not indicate the degree to which a country invests resources into enforcing its 
competition laws.  Continuing with the net metaphor, the Scope Index tells us the size of 
the competition law net without saying anything about the likelihood that the government 
will attempt to swing the net at any firm. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present histograms of the number of countries for each Scope Index 
score.  The first histogram shows the Scope Index scores after modifying each EU 
member state’s law to reflect that of the EU.  The second histogram shows the scores 
based entirely on national competition statutes. 
 
Why look at both histograms?  Clearly, a large firm operating within the European Union 
should worry about EU law.  Why, then, should we consider the Scope Index based on 
national statutes?  Several reasons can be offered.  First, the law based on national 
statutes may provide a more accurate picture of the “real law” in every nation, since the 
national statutes presumably reflect local legislative preferences.  At the least, the 
national statutes provide a measure of the minimum that should be expected of the 
national competition regimes.  Second, an enterprise or concerted practice may be of a 
sort that, if located in Europe, would operate entirely within the borders of an EU 
member state.  A price-fixing conspiracy, for example, might target the consumers of a 
specific country. 
 
Figure 1 suggests immediately that for large firms – firms that would operate across 
borders if located within the EU – antitrust risk as measured by the law on the books is 
quite a bit higher in the European Union than in any other region of the world.  The 
countries with the highest score (28) are all in the EU as of 2004: Austria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  By comparison, the score for 
the United States is 25.  The country with the lowest score (2) is Paraguay. 
 
                                                 
24 See Appendix A2 infra pp. 53-54 for an example of templates for Belgium based on national law and on 
EU law. 
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Figure 1 has a roughly bimodal shape, suggesting that at least for large enterprises, 
antitrust risk can be described in terms of a division between the European Union and the 
rest of the world.  The modal Scope Index for the EU region is 27, while that for the rest 
of the world is 20.  Most of the countries at the rest-of-the-world modal score are from 
Asia and non-EU Europe.  South American competition law regimes appear to be the 
weakest, measured in terms of the scope of the laws.  Competition law regimes in Africa 
and in Central America are distributed evenly over the non-EU scores. 
 
Figure 2 presents Scope Index scores based entirely on national statutes.  Even when EU 
law is not taken into account, the most extensive national competition laws are generally 
found in EU Europe.  Although, surprisingly, none of the EU Europe countries are among 
those with the highest Scope Indexes (based on national codes), most of the EU countries 
have scores in the upper half of the distribution, ranging from 18 to 24.  The countries 
with the highest scores (25) are Australia (Oceania), Barbados (Caribbean), Belarus (non-
EU Europe), Malawi (Africa), and the United States. 
 
Both histograms show that African countries have more extensive laws than one might 
have guessed.  One of the highest scores in Figure 2 belongs to an African country, 
Malawi; and the African countries are fairly evenly distributed over the range.  Our 
intuition initially was that the group of relatively poor developing countries, of which 
Africa has a disproportionate share, would be the last to devote scarce resources to 
competition law enforcement.  However, this intuition appears to be wrong. 
 
If one were operating a company with a regional business base, the regional differences 
in competition law might be an important factor to consider.  Exposure to antitrust risk is 
clearly greatest in EU-Europe and lowest in South America, Central America, and Africa.  
Of course, one might have predicted right away that these differences would be observed.  
Wealthier countries have more money to spend on their regulatory preferences than do 
poor countries.  However, the chart allows one to quantify the magnitude of the 
differences, which we will explore in more detail shortly.  Moreover, it reveals some 
anomalies, the most prominent of which is that Africa is stronger in terms of the scope of 
its competition laws than South America, which is the opposite of what one would expect 
if predicting on the basis of wealth. 
 
2. Scope Index Minus Defenses 
 
The Scope Index which we have presented measures the number of ways in which a firm 
could get into trouble under the nation’s competition law, or, informally, the size of the 
competition law net.  However, the Scope Index score says nothing about the number of 
defenses that are available to a firm.  In other words, the Scope Index measures the size 
of the net without saying anything about the number of holes in it. 
 
In order to get a measure of the size of the net that also takes into account the number of 
holes in it, we generated an alternative scope measure based on the scope score net of 
defenses.  The Scope Index Minus Defenses is found by taking the Scope Index for each 
country and subtracting off the total score of the defenses permitted under the law. The 
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total score for defenses was computed by adding up scores for efficiency defenses 
permitted in the law and for the public interest defense in merger statutes. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the Scope Index Minus Defenses.  Figure 3 is 
based on EU law, Figure 4 is based on national competition statutes.  Again, one can 
think of Figure 4 as showing a minimal expectation of the law. 
 
The bimodal shape that appeared in Figure 1 is replicated in Figure 3, which corrects the 
scope measure by taking defenses into account.  Similarly, the roughly bell-shaped curve 
of Figure 2 is replicated in Figure 4. 
 
In spite of these broad similarities, there are some important differences that appear when 
one takes defenses into account in trying to measure the scope of competition laws.  
Figures 3 and 4 show that subtracting defenses from the Scope Index generates a tighter 
distribution.  In other words, taking defenses into account makes the world’s antitrust 
regimes look more similar.  In both Figures 3 and 4, the high scores move in closer to the 
median, while the low scores remain fixed.  In Figure 3, the highest EU scores drop from 
28 to 25.  In Figure 4, the United States and Barbados fall to 22 from a score of 25, 
Australia to 21 from 25, Malawi to 23 from 25, and Belarus to 24 from 25.  The modal 
scores for the non-EU countries in both Figures change little, reflecting the fact that most 
of the modal countries have modest efficiency defenses in comparison to the United 
States and to the EU.  The leftward shift of both distributions, in comparison to Figures 1 
and 2, is observed because the regimes with the most extensive prohibitions also have the 










































 Figure 1: Histogram of Scope Index (with EU law) 






































Figure 2: Histogram of Scope Index (national codes) 
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Figure 3: Histogram of “Scope Index Minus Defenses” with EU law 
  







































Figure 4: Histogram of “Scope Index Minus Defenses” 
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B. Regional Comparisons by subject matter 
 
In this section I compare regions according to the overall Scope Index and various sub-
indexes measuring the scope of the law on certain subject matters, such as dominance (or, 
equivalently, monopolization).  These comparisons provide a more detailed picture of the 
regional variation in the law, and allow us to quantify regional differences in the law. 
 
1. Scope Index 
 
The first comparison is of regional differences in the Scope Index.  As both Figures 5 and 
6 indicate, consistent with the histograms shown earlier, the strongest regimes are those 
of EU Europe and North America, with non-EU Europe following.  When using EU law 
rather than the national competition statutes, the EU region is by far the strongest.  When 
using national statutes (Figure 6) to determine the scope of regional competition laws, 
North America leads the EU.  The weakest regimes are Central America and South 
America.  The Middle East/North Africa, Caribbean, and Asian countries make up the 
middle ground. 
 
Since the Scope Index scores can be considered as measures of the size of the 
competition law nets in these various regions, we can make rough quantitative 
assessments of the differences in legal regimes.  Taking this approach, Figures 5 and 6 
suggest that the competition law net in Africa is 31 percent larger than that in South 
America.  The North American competition law net is 75 percent larger than that of 
South America.  The competition law net for EU Europe, based on EU law rather than the 
national statutes, is by far the largest, roughly 25 percent larger than that of North 
America and more than double that of South America. 
 
One gets a sense from Figures 5 and 6 of the great disparity between EU competition law 
and that of most other regimes.  If we treat the Scope Index as a measure of weight, and 
we take the mean Scope Index as the rough balancing point for the various regimes, then 
Figures 5 and 6 show a dramatic change in balancing points when we shift from EU law 
to that of the national statutes.  EU law and that of North America roughly balance the 
weight of the regimes from the rest of the world (Figure 5).  When using national 
competition law statutes, the disparity in weights is not so great: the top four regions 
roughly balance the weight of the bottom five (Figure 6). 
 
Translating this quantitative assessment of the law’s scope into a statement about the risk 
of being penalized under a country’s competition law requires the additional assumption 
that each country is equally likely to enforce the laws on its books. In other words, if the 
Scope Index is a measure of a country’s competition law net, then it is a reasonable 
measure of antitrust risk only if enforcement authorities are equally likely to swing the 
net in each country.  Obviously, this is incorrect.  But the thought exercise is still useful 
as a measure of antitrust risk on the assumption of equal enforcement efficiency across 
regimes.  In addition, it suggests that an accurate measure of antitrust risk could be 
determined by decomposing risk into a legal component, based on the scope of the 
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country’s laws, and an enforcement component, based on the zeal with which local 












































































Figure 6: Scope Index by Region (national laws) 
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2. Dominance Scores 
 
We turn our attention now to dominance law – or, in the language of American antitrust 
specialists, monopolization law.  The Dominance score is an attempt to measure the 
number of types of conduct specified in a country’s competition law as unlawful abuse of 
a dominant position.  For those familiar with American law, the dominance measure is an 
attempt to measure the scope of laws equivalent to Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  One 
can think of the Dominance score as the size of the net specifically designed to capture 
dominant firms that engage in anticompetitive conduct.25 
 
Figures 7 and 8 present the Dominance scores.  Again, the EU and North America are the 
leading regions.  The EU leads if EU law is used rather than the national competition 
statutes (Figure 7), and North America leads if national competition statutes are used to 
assess the scope of dominance law (Figure 8).  Of course, the lead enjoyed by the EU law 
is quite substantial: the dominance score for the EU, based on EU law, is 33 percent 
larger than that for North America.  When national competition statutes are used to assess 
the scope of dominance law, North America is only slightly ahead of the EU.  
 
The weakest regimes in terms of dominance law are Africa, Central America, and South 
America.  South America and Central America remain the two weakest regimes, as they 
appeared in the comparison of Scope Indexes (see Figures 5 and 6).  However, whereas 
South America was the weakest region in terms of overall scope, Central America is the 
weakest in terms of dominance law. 
 
The comparison based on national statutes indicates that most countries are either 
considerably above or considerably below the average (Figure 8), which is represented by 
the Middle East/North Africa (Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia).  Africa, 
consistent with our earlier description of the Scope Index, is among the weak regimes, 
but is stronger than Central America and South America.  This is a bit surprising because 
one would think that attempting to control monopolies would be a low priority in 
relatively underdeveloped countries; and Africa, especially sub-Saharan, is 
unambiguously less developed than either the Central America or South America regions.   
 
Table 1 shows the “average country GDP per capita” in 2005 (in U.S. dollars) in the 
regions used for this study, where this average is computed by averaging the GDPs of the 
countries within a regional category.  For example, the $37,900 figure for North America 
represents the average of the GDP per capita for Canada and that for the U.S.  Since all of 
the countries used to complete the table have competition laws, the GDP per capita 
figures are in many cases higher than what would appear if we took the average of the per 
capita GDPs for all of the countries in each region.  Comparing Table 1 to Figure 8, one 
observes that except for the case of Africa, there is a roughly monotonic relationship 
between regional “average country GDP” and the scope of regional dominance law.  
                                                 
25 The Dominance scores were computed by summing all of the points in each country’s template for the 
various types of conduct that are prohibited under the dominance section.  For example, in the case of New 
Zealand (Table A1), the Dominance score is 4. 
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Africa stands out as having a much broader set of laws than one would predict on the 








Middle East $9,800 
Caribbean $9,466 
South America $7,788 
Asia $7,627 
Central America $7,540 
Africa $3,385 
 
Table 1: Average Country GDP by Region, 2005 




































































Figure 8: Dominance Score (national laws) 
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        Figure 9: Restrictive Trade Practices (EU law) 

































        Figure 10: Restrictive Trade Practices Score (national laws) 
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3. Restrictive Trade Practices 
 
Restrictive Trade Practices refers to collusive conduct and agreements that restrain trade 
– conduct that would fall under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Figures 9 and 10 examine 
the scope of laws governing restrictive trade practices by region. The Restricted Trade 
Practices score measures the size of the net designed specifically to catch firms that 
engage in collusive anticompetitive conduct or enter into contracts that restrain trade. 
 
The first observation suggested by Figures 9 and 10 concerns the EU region.  When using 
EU law as the source of European competition law, the EU comes out in the lead on 
restrictive trade practices law (Figure 9).  When using national laws as the source of 
European competition law, the EU region lands in the middle of competition law regimes 
(Figure 10).  This is a clear illustration of the dual competition law regime that exists in 
the EU.  Since the national statutes are weaker with respect to restrictive trade practices, 
the rate of collusive activity among small firms that fall under the jurisdiction of national 
competition laws should be substantially larger than the rate of collusive activity among 
big firms in the EU.  Moreover, it implies that a group of big firms contemplating 
collusive conduct in the EU would be well advised to carry out their plan through small 
intermediaries, thus opting for a more lenient legal regime. 
 
Both Figures 9 and 10 show that outside of the EU region, the top regimes are North 
America followed by Oceania, whose position is largely based on the cartel laws of 
Australia and New Zealand.  Asia is third, reflecting the extensive prohibitions in South 
Korea, India, and Taiwan.  Central America is fourth, which is surprising in view of its 
generally weak competition laws.  The explanation for the unusually strong showing for 
Central America is that of the five countries we put in this category (Mexico, Panama, 
Cost Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador ), two of them (Mexico and Panama) have the highest 
scores possible on cartel practices.  In addition, although Costa Rica’s cartel laws are far 
from the strictest, they are stricter than average.  Thus, although Central America is a 
weak region overall in terms of competition law, it is relatively strong on cartel 
practices.26 
 
One empirical question immediately suggested is whether countries with competition 
laws focused primarily on cartel practices perform better in economic terms than other 
countries.  Dominance law has been an uncertain and controversial affair, at least if 
judged by the U.S. experience.  Judge Posner, relatively early in his career as a scholar, 
suggested that the uncertainties of dominance law were so daunting that Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act should be repealed.27  And it has been a well known if not openly 
acknowledged policy of Republican administrations since Reagan to shift antitrust 
enforcement toward cartel practices and away from unilateral conduct by dominant firms.  
The variation in international laws may permit researchers to determine whether the 
evidence on economic performance would support such a shift. 
                                                 
26 Some commentators have urged precisely this policy for developing countries, and especially Latin 
America.  See Malcolm B. Coate et al., Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating Government and Business, 
24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 37, 81 (1992). 
27 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 214-216 (1976). 
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The weakest regions in terms of cartel regulation are Africa, South America, and Middle 
East/North Africa.  Non-EU Europe is relatively weak, with a restrictive trade practices 
score that is roughly similar to that of Africa.  Asia has stronger cartel laws than Non-EU 
Europe. 
 
In the area of cartel regulation there is a substantial difference between EU and non-EU 
Europe, whether one looks at EU law or the national statutes.  Based on EU law, the EU 
region’s cartel net is roughly 75 percent larger than that of non-EU Europe.  Based on 
national statutes, the difference is 13 percent.  Non-EU Europe includes several countries 
from southeastern Europe and some former Communist regimes.  As relatively poor 
countries, they have not devoted significant resources to competition law.  The puzzle is 
why this difference would be most apparent with respect to cartel regulation, and not in 
the area of dominance law. 
 
4. Merger Law 
 
The Merger Score attempts to measure the size of the competition law net applied to 
mergers.  It is the sum of the scores for two parts of each country’s merger law; the part 
governing merger notification requirements, and the part governing the assessment of 
mergers.  It excludes points assigned to defenses, such as efficiency or public-interest 
defenses.  The countries with mandatory-premerger notification requirements tend to 
have the highest merger scores. 
 
Most of the Merger Scores follow expected patterns.  The EU region is the most 
restrictive regime, based on EU law, and third in rank on the basis of national statutes. 
The score for the EU region based on EU law is 7, while the score for the EU region 
based on national statutes is 5.8, a relatively small difference in scores.  This reflects the 
fact that many EU nations already have mandatory premerger notification regimes.   EU 
law does not introduce significant burdens for big firms that would not be faced under the 
national statutes. 
 
Surprisingly, Middle East/North Africa is the second strongest regime on merger law.  
The reason for this strong showing is that among the countries in this category – Algeria, 
Israel, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia – all except Tunisia have mandatory-premerger 
notification regimes.  North America is third in rank. 
 
South America appears, again, as the weakest regime.  This is because mandatory-
premerger notification regimes are relatively rare in South America.  Of the nine 
countries in this category (Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Columbia, Brazil), only two (Argentina and Columbia) have mandatory-
premerger notification requirements.  Six of the nine (Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela) have no merger notification requirements at all. 
 
Africa is among the weaker regimes, but it is the strongest of the relatively weak merger 
law regimes.  Merger law in Africa is more demanding than that on average in Asia, 
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Oceania, Central America, Caribbean, and South America.  Again, this is a bit of 
anomaly given that merger control is an activity that one would assume to be on the low 
end of priorities for developing countries.  Africa’s merger score may reflect a tendency, 
viewed critically by development economists such as P.T. Bauer, for African countries to 
adopt relatively interventionist laws in comparison to other countries at comparable 
stages of economic development.  In Bauer’s view this tendency was an important 
obstacle to Africa’s development.28 
                                                 
28 P.T. BAUER, REALITY AND RHETORIC: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 27- 35 (1984).  
More recently, the risk that interventionist laws could retard development has been raised in the context of 
competition laws adopted by transition economies.  See Paul E. Godek, A Chicago-School Approach to 
Antitrust in Developing Nations, 43 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 261 (1992); William E. Kovacic, Institutional 
Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and 
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 276 (2001); Armando E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, 














































































































































In addition to substantive law, competition law regimes can be ranked in terms of the 
penalties applied to firms.  The Remedy Score, shown in Figures 13 and 14, is an index 
measuring the range of punishments available to competition law enforcement 
authorities.  Three types of punishment are considered here: fines, prison sentences, and 
divestiture orders.  The highest score that a country can get is 3, the lowest is obviously 0. 
 
North America is the strongest regime with an average of 3.  South America is the 
weakest regime with an average of 1.  The world average is represented by Central 
American and Middle East/North Africa, with scores of 1.8. 
 
The dual system of EU law is evident in Figures 13 and 14.  When EU law is taken into 
account, the EU region is second in rank following North America.  When national laws 
are consulted, the EU region is one of the weakest regimes.  Clearly, this implies that the 
rate of competition law violations should be considerably higher among smaller firms in 
the EU that escape the jurisdiction of the European Commission. 
 
Even if we evaluate the EU region on the basis of EU law rather than the national 
statutes, it is arguably further behind North America than is suggested by the Remedy 
Scores.  The reason is that the EU does not provide for prison sentences.  The only reason 
the EU score is above 2 in Figure 13 is because some of the member states have statutes 
that provide for prison sentences, and EU law allows for the penalty applied under a more 
rigorous national statute to be applied. 
 
Prison sentences are probably frightening to executives of large firms.  They present a 
risk that a highly-compensated officer will lose his income for a period of years, and find 
it difficult to be reintegrated into the business world after his release.  Given this, the 
difference between EU and North American law should be viewed as quite significant. 
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6. Efficiency Defenses 
 
To this point we have considered regional comparisons of prohibitions and penalties set 
out in competition laws.   Now we consider efficiency defenses.  Efficiency defenses 
appear in the laws governing merger assessment, restrictive trade practices, and 
dominance.  The three sets of efficiency defenses are grouped together in Figures 15 – 
20. 
 
Some patterns can be discerned.  The regional patterns suggest that the countries that 
offer efficiency defenses as part of dominance law also offer efficiency defenses as part 
of their merger laws.  North America is most generous in its efficiency defenses, both in 
merger law and in dominance law.  The EU on the other hand is stingy, at least in 
comparison to North America.  In terms of EU law, the EU region does offer an 
efficiency defense for mergers.  However, in terms of national laws, the EU is relatively 
stingy in offering efficiency defenses for dominant firms and for merging firms.  Indeed, 
the stinginess with respect to efficiency defenses appears to be a pan-European trait: non-
EU Europe is also stingy in offering such defenses for merging and for dominant firms. 
 
It makes intuitive sense that the countries that are willing to consider efficiency defenses 
in actions against dominant firms will also consider such defenses in merger disputes.  
The issues are similar.  In the United States, Sherman Act Section 2, which governs 
dominant firms, and Clayton Act Section 7, which governs mergers, could both be used 
by a litigant in an attempt to prevent or reverse a merger.  Given the similar concerns in 
dominance and merger law, it would appear strange for a competition authority to take 
efficiency defenses into account in one area and not in the other.  Most countries appear 
to follow a consistent pattern of being relatively generous or relatively stingy in 
efficiency defenses for both parts of the law.  The one unusual case is Asia, which is 
relatively generous in efficiency defenses for merger cases and relatively stingy in 
efficiency defenses for dominant firms. 
 
The consistent patterns that one should expect to observe in dominance and merger law 
should not necessarily appear in restrictive trade practices law.  A legal system might 
provide several efficiency defenses for dominant firms without providing the same 
number for cartels, as the U.S. law illustrates.  Indeed the standard argument in the U.S. 
for offering fewer efficiency defenses for restrictive trade practices is that they tend as a 
class to be more consistently harmful to economic welfare.  Given this, it is reasonable to 
infer, in the absence of strong countervailing evidence, that a cartel does not have an 
efficiency basis; and given this inference, it may be efficient to limit the scope for 
efficiency defenses in cartel cases. 
 
North America and Oceania are the most generous in terms of efficiency defenses for 
cartel practices, with EU Europe closely behind.  South America is by far the least 
generous in terms of efficiency defenses for cartel practices. 
 
One might argue that the result for South America is simply an artifact of the earlier data 
on prohibitions.  If a region is relatively weak in prohibitions, then it should obviously be 
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weak in terms of defenses to those prohibitions.  The problem with this argument is that a 
weak law with no defenses can still pose substantial risks to potential defendants, 
especially if the prohibitive part of the law is general in character.  A very limited set of 
general prohibitions coupled with few or no defenses could easily put potential 
defendants in a position in which they are unable to predict whether a given course of 
conduct violates the law.  Such a regime gives a worrisome degree of discretion to 
enforcement authorities.  A risk-averse potential defendant might prefer to conduct 
business in a regime with more prohibitions coupled with a larger set of defenses. 
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Figure 15: Dominance Efficiency Defense (EU law) 





























Figure 16: Dominance Efficiency Defense (national laws) 
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Figure 17: Merger Efficiency Defense (EU law) 






























Figure 18: Merger Efficiency Defense (national laws) 
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Figure 19: Restrictive Trade Practices Efficiency Defense (EU law) 
 































Figure 20: Restrictive Trade Practices Efficiency Defense (national laws) 
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IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
Does the presence of a competition law have an impact on the competitiveness of a 
nation’s economy?  One way to answer this question is to use regression analysis to see if 
the presence of a competition law appears to have a statistically significant impact on 
some measure of competitiveness.  Several recent studies have done this,29 using a 
dummy variable that indicates whether or not the country has a competition law. 
 
The information we have coded on competition law regimes provides a richer measure of 
competition law.  While previous studies have used a single dummy variable to indicate 
the presence of a competition statute, the Scope Index allows us to use a quantitative 
measure of the law that tracks the restrictiveness of a country’s competition statute.  In 
other words, while previous studies have used a variable that indicates whether there is a 
competition law net in a country, our data permit us to use a variable that indicates the 
size of the competition law net. 
 
The basic regression model in this study assumes that the intensity of competition in a 
nation’s economy is influenced by the scope of that nation’s competition law.  In other 
words, if the variable CI represents a proxy for the competition intensity of an economy, 
and SI is the Scope Index, the basic model assumes CI = f(SI, X1, X2,…, XN), where 
X1,…,XN represent other factors that influence competitiveness. 
 
A. Theoretical background 
 
To many economists the Lerner index,30 which measures the percentage mark-up of the 
firm’s price over marginal cost at the profit-maximizing production level, provides a 
desirable theoretical measure of a firm’s market power.  For this reason, it also serves as 
an index of the competitive intensity of the market in which the firm operates.  If the firm 
faces few competitors, it will be relatively unconstrained by competition and will charge 
a price that is close to the monopoly price.  On the other hand, if the firm faces many 
competitive constraints it will be forced to charge a price that is close to marginal cost.  








=  , 
 
where p represents price and mc represents marginal cost (at the profit maximizing level 
of output) and εd is the elasticity of demand for the firm’s product. 
 
An alternative to the standard monopoly model is the Cournot model of competition, 
which examines the profit-maximizing output choices of firms when they face 
                                                 
29 See Mikyung Yun et al., Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing 
Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE 259-330 (2005) (available 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041_en.pdf); Krakowicz, supra note 4. 
30 Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 157, 157-75 (1934). 
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competition from rivals.  The Cournot model is mathematically more complicated than 
the standard monopoly model.  However, for our purposes, the model’s implications for 
the Lerner index are all that is necessary.   Suppose there are N firms and that the inverse 
demand curve for the good produced by those firms is p = a –bQ, where Q is the sum of 
the output levels of the N firms (i.e., Q = q1 + …+ qN).  Suppose, in addition, each firm 
produces with a simple cost function C = cqi, i = 1,…,N.  In this version of the Cournot 











Treating the price-cost markup as a proxy for competition intensity, this equation 
suggests that competition intensity is determined by the factors that influence: (1) the 
level of aggregate demand (represented by the demand shift parameter a), (2) production 
costs (c), and (3) the number of firms serving the market (N). 
 
The empirical analysis conducted below takes the competition intensity equation (1) as 
the theoretical foundation for the regression models employed.  The model specifications 
reflect our attempts to use variables that influence aggregate demand, production costs, or 
the number of firms serving the market.  The one additional factor that we introduce into 
the model is the law.  The Scope Index measure is included as an explanatory variable, on 
the theory that competition intensity should increase as the scope of the competition law 
expands. 
 
Using the Cournot framework as the starting point, the basic regression model will 
therefore have the following form 
 
CI = β1SI + β2a + β3c + β4N. 
 
CI, the dependent variable, is a proxy for the intensity of competition in a nation’s 
economy.  The variable SI is the Scope Index.  If we assume that CI increases with the 
intensity of competition, then any variable that causes the market to become more 
competitive likely reduces the price-cost markup, and increases CI.  If an increase in the 
scope of a nation’s competition law leads to a more competitive economy, the estimated 
value of β1 will be positive in our regressions.  The Cournot model implies β2 is positive, 
β3 is negative, and β4 is negative. 
 
The intensity of competition within a country cannot be observed or measured directly.  
Given this, we will use survey and other measures as proxies.  Since the aggregate 
demand shift parameter a and the cost parameter c cannot be directly observed, we will 
use variables that proxy for them.  In addition, we will use variables that impact entry, 
exit, and foreign competition to account for the number of firms serving the market. 
 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. INTRILIGATOR, MATHEMATICAL OPTIMIZATION AND ECONOMIC THEORY 207-209 
(1971). 
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Because the Cournot model parameters cannot be observed directly, and will therefore 
have to be represented, in a sense, by variables that influence them, it will not be 
straightforward to derive the implications of the Cournot model for the signs of the 
regression coefficients.  To take an example, suppose we use GDP per capita as a 
variable that influences the demand shift parameter a.  GDP per capita also influences the 
number of firms that will enter, since a wealthier economy will attract more sellers of 
goods.  Thus, the impact of GDP per capita in a regression analysis will reflect 
countervailing influences: increasing prices by lifting demand and reducing prices by 
encouraging entry of firms.  Because of these countervailing effects, we make no effort to 
predict the signs of regression coefficients for the variables that we use to proxy for the 
Cournot model parameters. 
 
B. Basic Model 
 
The simplest regression model, which we examine in this part, treats the scope of a 
nation’s competition law as if it were independent of the intensity of competition in the 
nation’s economy.  In other words, causation is assumed to run only one way: from the 
law to the intensity of competition.  The model assumes that increasing the scope of the 
law causes competition among firms in the economy to become more intense.  The 
reason this is assumed to occur is because a broader set of competition laws restrains 
conduct with anticompetitive effects (e.g., collusion, monopolization, mergers toward 
monopoly).  Of course, as we discuss later, this assumption of one-way causation may be 
incorrect. 
 
Results for the basic model appear in Tables 2 through 5.  We used two variables as 
proxies for the notional dependent variable, the intensity of competition.  One is a survey 
measure of the intensity of local competition, compiled by the World Economic Forum. 
The intensity of competition survey measure runs from 1 (not intense) to 7 (intense).  
Because of the subjective nature of this measure, we will sometimes refer to it as the 
perceived intensity of competition.  The other proxy is the Purchasing Power Parity 
index, which we use below as an objective measure of the intensity of competition. 
 
The key independent variables are the Scope Index (based on national competition 
codes), GDP per capita, the log of population, the average wage in the manufacturing 
sector, government spending as a percentage of GDP, the competition enforcement 
budget as a percentage of GDP, and the number of years that the nation has had a 
competition law.  The table also includes dummy variables that indicate whether the 
country has a competition agency.  Finally, we have included dummy variables indicating 
the region of the country. 
 
As noted, we have used the Scope Index based on national competition statutes.  This 
matters only in the case of EU Europe, because EU Europe is a much stronger regime if 
the law is coded on the basis of the EU provisions.  However, the national statutes offer 
richer variation in the Scope Index measure, and provide at least a minimal and arguably 
more accurate measure of the scope of the competition law in a particular EU country. 
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1. Subjective Measure of Competition Intensity as Dependent Variable 
 
Competition Law Effect 
 
The most important variable in this study is the Scope Index, our measure of the size of 
the competition law net.  Our first tables of results, Tables 2 and 3, present regression 
results using the World Economic Forum’s survey measure of the intensity of 
competition in a nation’s economy in the years 2003 and 2004 respectively. 
 
Although far from conclusive, there is evidence in Tables 2 and 3 that the size of the 
competition law net is associated with greater intensity of competition – at least as 
reflected in the World Economic Forum’s survey measure.  In the first column of Table 2 
the regression coefficient for the Scope Index is .02 and is statistically significant.  The 
remaining columns of Table 2 report estimates from a high of .028 to a low of .014.  The 
estimates for 2003 suggest that for every one point increase in the Scope Index, the 
Competition Intensity survey measure increases by nearly .02.  The results in Table 3, for 
the year 2004, are also consistent with an estimate of roughly .02 for the impact of the 
Scope Index. 
 
To consider a concrete example of the implications of these results, take the case of Peru, 
which has a Scope Index of 13 and a Competition Intensity measure of 4.7 for 2003.  
Although as a general rule regression results should be considered useful only for small 
extrapolations, let us consider a relatively large extrapolation, recognizing that the answer 
is most likely an overstatement.  Suppose Peru were to revamp its competition statute, so 
that the Scope Index increases by 5 points to a new score of 18.  The results of Table 1 
suggest that the maximum increase in the Competition Intensity measure that would 
result is 0.1.  In other words, a 5 point increase in the Scope Index could increase the 
Competition Intensity measure from 4.7 to 4.8. 
 
In terms of statistical significance, the results of Tables 2 and 3 are mixed, though largely 
supportive of the claim that the scope of a nation’s competition law is positively 
associated with the intensity of competition in its economy.  Of course, there is also the 
question of economic significance.  Even if we view the results as indicating a 
statistically significant marginal impact of .02 for the Scope Index, this may fall below 
what some observers would consider an economically significant impact.  Return to the 
example of Peru.  Suppose, somewhat fantastically, Peru were to overhaul its competition 
laws to raise the Scope Index from 13 to one of the highest scores possible, 28.  Such a 
large increase in the scope of Peru’s competition laws would, these results suggest, 
increase Peru’s Competition Intensity measure in 2003 from 4.7 to 5.  This is of course a 
substantial increase, given that the Competition Intensity measure runs from 1 to 7.  But 
in terms of its overall rank among competitive economies, Peru would remain far below 
the most intensively competitive economies (e.g., U.S., Hong Kong, Germany, United 
Kingdom).32 
 
                                                 
32 Specifically, Peru would move from 46th place to 36th place based on the 2003 WEF’s competition 
intensity survey results. 
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In addition to our measure for the scope of the competition laws, we have also included a 
variable measuring the number of years the competition law has been effect (in some 
form),33 a variable measuring the competition law enforcement budget as a percentage of 
GDP, and a dummy variable indicating the existence of a competition law enforcement 
agency. 
 
The point of the Age of Competition Law variable is to capture the extent to which a 
culture of enforcement may have developed.  A nation that has had a competition law for 
100 years is likely to have a different view toward enforcement than a nation that has had 
a competition law for only 5 years.  Although Table 2 shows no significant effect for the 
age of the law, Table 3 suggests that there may be a significant impact.  The larger 
estimates suggest that each year the law has been in effect increases the competition 
intensity survey measure by as much as .01.  Taking the larger estimate as an upper 
bound, this suggests that it would take quite a long time, perhaps a century or more, for a 
competition law to move a country up one digit (on the scale of 1 to 7) in the survey 
measure of competition intensity.34 
 
The variable measuring enforcement budget relative to GDP was included in order to see 
whether countries that spend more on competition, relative to the size of the economy, 
have better results in terms of the intensity of competition.  Because we have so few 
observations on budgets, the results are weak (see Table 2, column 5).  We have no 
evidence of the competition enforcement budget having a significant impact on perceived 
competitive intensity. 
 
Our variable indicating the existence of a competition law enforcement agency also fails 
to show a substantial impact, except for the last column of Table 2.  However, because it 
is correlated with the Scope Index, it appears to have robbed the Scope Index of some its 
explanatory power.  Introducing the agency dummy causes the scope measure to fall in 




In addition to measures of competition law, such as the scope of the competition statute 
and its age, several other variables used in the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 have 
statistically significant effects on perceived competitive intensity.  GDP per capita, is 
positive and statistically significant in each regression.  In particular, each $1000 increase 
in GDP per capita increases the survey measure of competition intensity by roughly .02. 
                                                 
33 As the American experience suggests, a competition law may have been in effect for many years, and yet 
the law may have changed substantially over that period.  Competition laws in particular are almost always 
in a process of revision.  The Age of Competition Law variable in our regressions measures the age of the 
statute from the enactment date of its key parts.  For example, the U.S. competition law’s age is measured 
from the enactment year of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (2000), (1890).  No effort has been made to 
incorporate significant changes, such as the enactment of additional legislation (e.g., the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. §19 (2000), in the U.S. in 1914).  
34 See Krakowski, supra note 4, which discusses learning curve effects.  If learning effects dampen as the 
time increases, then the marginal impact of an additional year after having a law for 10 years is smaller 
than that of the additional year after having a law for five years. 
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Recall that the Cournot competition model introduced at the start of this discussion 
pointed to three determinants of competition intensity: the demand shift parameter, the 
cost parameter, and the number of firms.  GDP per capita probably impacts at least two of 
these parameters, since a wealthier economy will attract more firms and also generate a 
greater demand for goods.  The positive estimate for GDP per capita suggests that the 
market expanding effect of increasing national wealth is greater than the demand 
enhancing effect. 
 
Since the marginal impact of $1000 increase in GDP per capital is roughly similar to that 
of a one point increase in the Scope Index, the regression estimates provide an alternative 
view on the economic significance of increasing the scope of competition laws.  
Expanding the scope of a nation’s competition law enough to add one point to the Scope 
Index appears to be equivalent, in terms of its effect on the intensity of competition 
survey measure, to increasing GDP per capita by $1000.  Of course, this suggests that 
relatively small changes in the scope of the competition law can have an economically 
significant impact. 
 
The log of population is included as an independent variable in order to directly control 
for the size of the market, which we assume increases with population.  The results 
indicate that a one percent increase in population is associated with a .1 increase in the 
intensity of competition measure.  This is a large impact, and suggests the relative 
importance of increasing the size of the market (e.g., entry of firms).  As a policy 
implication, this estimate, coupled with the significant estimate for imports as a percent 
of GDP, suggests that opening local markets to global competition is the fastest way to 
increase the intensity of competition. 
 
Government consumption as a percentage of GDP was included in order to control for the 
size of the public sector.  Our assumption was that the level of public sector spending 
should have some impact on the intensity of competition, though the direction of the 
impact is unclear a priori.  If government consumption tracks the degree to which 
government intervenes in the market and imposes a regulatory burden on firms, it should 
reduce the intensity of competition, primarily by limiting entry.  If, on the other hand, 
government consumption tracks the degree to which government provides important 
public goods, such as law enforcement, it should be correlated with an increase in 
competitive intensity.  In any event, the results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that government 
spending does not have a substantial impact on the intensity of competition. 
 
Regional Effects Regressions 
 
The last two columns of Tables 2 and 3 use dummy variables for each of the regions 
examined earlier in this study.  The reason is to capture “fixed effects” specific to each 
region.  If, for example, the economies of Non-EU Europe are less competitively intense 
than those of other regions, this method allows us to take that into account in the 
regression analysis.  Since we are unable to include a dummy variable for each country, 
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which would be necessary to control for country-specific fixed effects, we consider these 
as “quasi-fixed effects” regressions. 
 
The region excluded from the table is Asia, which means that the estimates for each 
region should be understood in comparison to Asia.  For example, the statistically 
significant -.755 estimate for Non-EU Europe implies that the perceived intensity of 
competition for the average Non-EU Europe country is almost a point below that of the 
average Asian country. 
 
Several points are suggested by the regressions in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.  First, the 
effect of the competition law’s scope appears to be stronger when region specific effects 
are taken into account.  Whereas the marginal impact is .020 without the region specific 
dummy variables, the marginal impact is .028 (see column 6) with them included.  This 
difference is important because the region specific dummy variables may be controlling 
for more than just regional differences in perceived competitiveness. 
 
Perhaps the most troubling problem that arises in a study such as this is how to estimate 
the impact of a competition law on the intensity of competition if the law itself is 
influenced or caused by the intensity of competition.  The regressions examined in Table 
1 assume that the level of competition intensity is influenced or “caused” by the scope of 
the competition law, and not the other way around.  However, the causation may be the 
reverse: the scope of the competition law may result in part from the intensity of local 
competition.  A competitively intense environment may not generate a call for a 
competition law.  We will examine this issue – endogeneity – in more detail in a later part 
of this paper. 
 
The quasi-fixed effects regressions provide an incomplete method of addressing one 
aspect of the endogeneity problem.  Suppose there are unobservable factors that lead to 
the adoption of a competition law and that also affect the perceived intensity of 
competition.  Suppose in addition that those factors differ by region and are largely 
uniform within each region.  If so, then the quasi-fixed effects regressions permit us to 
mitigate the bias that would ordinarily result from being unable to incorporate these 
factors directly into the regression model. 
 
The second point suggested by the last two columns is that enforcement may account for 
a substantial part of the estimated impact of the Scope Index.  In general, the estimated 
impact of the scope measure falls when the agency dummy is included in the regression.  
In the last column of both Tables 2 and 3, the Scope Index is relatively small and 
statistically insignificant while the agency variable is relatively large and statistically 
significant. 
 
The third point suggested by the last two regressions in Tables 2 and 3 is that Non-EU 
Europe stands apart from the rest of the world in terms of the perceived intensity of 
competition.  The perceived intensity of competition in Non-EU Europe economies is 
significantly less than that in all other regions.  This factor appears to explain a large part 
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of the increase in the estimated impact of the Scope Index after controlling for regional 
effects. 
 
Why is Non-EU Europe lagging behind all other regions in terms of the perceived 
intensity of competition?  Non-EU Europe includes several formerly socialist transition 
economies (Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Ukraine).  In many of these countries, state created monopolies have been privatized but 
remain relatively unconstrained by competition.  Moreover, state control over private 
business activity, such as the decision to enter a line of business, remains the norm.  
Under these conditions, the standard Cournot framework, even with a variable that 
controls for the level of public sector spending, may be insufficient to explain the 
variation in competition intensity outcomes. 
 
2. Objective Measure of Competition Intensity as Dependent Variable 
 
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the regressions of Tables 2 and 3, this time using an objective 
proxy for the intensity of competition, which also permits us to take advantage of a 
broader sample.  In these regressions, we use the Purchasing Power Parity index (PPP) 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  PPP is the exchange 
rate between currencies that equalizes in value a common basket of consumption items.  
For example, if a McDonald’s hamburger is priced at USD 2.00 in the U.S. and GBP 1.00 
in Britain, the PPP that equalizes the two currencies (American dollars and British 
pounds), treating hamburgers as the only item of consumption, is .5. 
 
Since one of the reasons the price of hamburger can be relatively high is local market 
power, we view PPP as a potential proxy for the intensity of competition.  Suppose, for 
example, that because of an increase in local market power, McDonald’s is able to raise 
the price of its hamburger in Britain from GBP 1.00 to GBP 1.50.  The PPP that equalizes 
dollars and pounds then increase from .5 to .75.   
 
This example suggests that even though PPP is just an exchange, and for that reason 
meaningless,35 it may still serve as an index that captures to some degree the effects of 
market power on prices.  If the Scope Index measure has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on PPP, we regard that as evidence as that it is increasing the intensity 
of competition. 
 
However, as Tables 4 and 5 reveal, the scope of the competition law does not have a 
statistically significant impact on PPP.  The sign of the Scope Index coefficient is often 
negative, suggesting that there may be a procompetitive effect.  However, the legal scope 
                                                 
35 Of course, the core of the problem here is that there are no good objective proxies that would allow us to 
assess competitive intensity across countries.  An alternative to using PPP is to use the GDP deflator 
multiplied by the Purchasing Power Parity index.  For this approach see Helmut Ziegelschmidt et al., 
Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Australia (OECD Working Paper No. 451, Oct. 
2005) (available http://ideas.repec.org/j/K20.html).  The GDP deflator is often used to measure relative 
prices over time within an economy.  However, since most publicly available GDP deflator series do not 
use common base periods, it is unclear that additional accuracy could be gained by using this approach 
instead of the direct comparison of PPPs.   
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measure is statistically insignificant in all of the regressions.  The same is true of the 
variable measuring the age of the competition statute; it has a consistently negative 
coefficient, which suggests a procompetitive impact, but it is statistically insignificant. 
 
As for the other variables, perhaps the most interesting suggestion from Tables 4 and 5 is 
that Non-EU Europe is not as bad as it is perceived in terms of the intensity of 
competition.  PPPs do not appear to be higher in that region than in most other regions.  
Africa, on the other hand, appears to be worse than perceived. 
 
C. Assessing Components of the Scope Index 
 
Table 6 breaks down the Scope Index into its key components, which are subindexes 
measuring the scope of the law on restrictive trade practices, the scope of the law on 
dominance, and the scope of merger law.  Our goal here is to see if there is any particular 
portion of competition law that is associated with greater intensity of competition.  Table 
6 examines the impacts of the subindexes on the WEF’s survey measure of the intensity 
of competition. 
 
Interestingly, the subindexes measuring substantive law – dominance, restrictive trade 
practices, and mergers – have statistically insignificant coefficients for the most part.  
However, the dominance index has a negative sign in the 2004 regressions and is both 
negative and statistically significant in one regression.  In other words, there is weak 
evidence that increasing the scope of dominance law reduces the perceived intensity of 
competition. 
 
The exceptional case in Table 6 is the subindex for enforcement, which is positive and 
statistically significant in the year 2004 regressions.  The 2004 results suggest that a one 
point increase in the enforcement subindex increases the intensity of competition survey 
measure by .13.  Of course, since the enforcement subindex has a maximum value of 3, 
increasing enforcement measures can have only a limited impact.  Still, the marginal 
impact of the enforcement variable is roughly six times that of the overall scope measure, 
which suggests that enforcement is more important than the scope of the substantive law. 
 
The signs and magnitudes of the subindexes suggest a ranking of the major components 
of competition law in terms of their effectiveness: enforcement, restrictive trade 
practices, mergers, and dominance.  While the estimates suggest that increasing the scope 
of restrictive trade practices law may enhance perceived competition intensity, increasing 
the scope of merger or dominance law appears not to offer such a potential gain.  Indeed, 
the third column suggests that increasing the dominance law index by one point reduces 
the perceived competition intensity by roughly one tenth of a point, which is equivalent 
in effect, according to the same regression, to reducing GDP per capita by $1000. 
 
Table 7 examines the impacts of the same subindexes on our objective proxy for the 
intensity of competition, the PPP index.  There is no evidence suggesting that any of the 




D. Endogeneity of Scope Index and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 
Given the causation and endogeneity issues, briefly discussed in Part IV.B.1, the 
statistically significant estimates for the Scope Index have to be regarded with some 
suspicion.  The standard approach to estimation in the presence of potential endogeneity 
bias is to use instrumental variables estimation.  In this part we report instrumental 
variable estimates of the impact of the Scope Index. 
 
To take a simple illustration of the endogeneity problem, suppose legislators in Zanadu 
are contemplating the enactment of a competition law, or expanding the scope of a law 
already in existence.  In legislative debates, opponents might note that competition is 
already perceived to be intense in Zanadu, and that there is, therefore, no need for such a 
law or expansion of existing law.  If the competition law opponents prevailed on the basis 
of this argument, then the perceived intensity of competition would have impacted the 
scope of the competition law in Zanadu. 
 
This illustration suggests that the key to finding suitable regressors is to find variables 
that affect the likelihood of a competition law being enacted, or modified, and at the same 
time are not influenced by the intensity of competition.  These variables would make 
ideal instrumental variables.  Of course, this is difficult to find in the context of 
competition law.  The goal for this project is to find instruments for the scope of the law 
variable.  This requires finding variables that satisfy the above requirement and that in 
addition are not obvious candidates as regressors in the competition intensity equation.   
 
We have taken instruments from two sources.  One is the “legal origin” variables of the 
“law and growth” literature.36  The other source is the WEF’s survey tables, which 
provide additional perception indexes that could serve as instrumental variables. 
 
The legal origin variables indicate whether the legal system in a country has its origins in 
the English, French, Scandinavian, German, or Socialist legal traditions.  Legal origin is 
clearly unaffected by the perceived intensity of competition.  Yet it may have an impact 
on the likelihood that a country will adopt a competition law, since the tendency toward 
interventionist policies appears to be influenced by legal origin.37 
 
The WEF’s survey tables also provide indexes that probably track variables that influence 
the likelihood of adoption or the scope of a competition law.  For example, in addition to 
surveying the intensity of competition, the WEF’s tables includes indexes measuring 
perceived favoritism of government to firms, the perceived regional disparity in the 
economic environment (e.g., infrastructure), and the perceived degree to which 
government subsidies distort markets.  Many of these perceptions probably influence the 
likelihood that a competition law will be enacted, expanded, or maintained. 
 
                                                 
36 Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999). 
37 Id. 
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Still, the difficulty in using many of the WEF’s survey measures is that they are likely to 
be correlated with the perceived intensity of competition.  The same business person who 
tells a WEF surveyor that competition is not intense in his country is also likely to think 
that government plays favorites among firms, or distorts the market with subsidies.  
Although these survey measures may explain the existence of a competition law, they are 
likely to be correlated with the perceived intensity of competition, the variable we are 
attempting to explain. 
 
In view of the difficulty of finding plausible instruments, we settled on the legal origin 
variables and the WEF’s survey measure of regional disparity in the economic 
environment.  Regional disparity apparently played some role in the enactment of the 
Sherman Act in the U.S.  Boudreaux, DiLorenzo, and Parker argue that farm lobbies 
seeking protection from the competition of large scale processing centers in cities played 
a substantial role in the enactment of U.S. antitrust law.38  Moreover, it is plausible that if 
firms believe that certain advantages attributable to economic environment, such as 
infrastructure, affect their ability to compete, they will pressure legislators for a 
competition law. 
 
The instrumental variable regression results appear in Table 8.  The first and third 
columns of  Table 8 use only the legal origin variables as instruments for the Scope 
Index.  The second and fourth columns use the legal origin variables and the WEF’s 
index of perceived regional disparity in the quality of the economic environment.  Both 
regressions fail to show a statistically significant impact for the Scope Index. 
 
Of course, these results are equally consistent with the theory that the law’s scope does 
positively impact the intensity of competition, but we have simply failed to find a good 





Every empirical study is tentative or provisional in the sense that its results are valid, at 
best, until the next empirical study upends its conclusions.  The same caveat applies here.  
Empirical researchers will develop better ways to measure the scope of antitrust law and 
to test its effectiveness in promoting competition than the methods used in this paper. 
 
This paper has presented measures of the scope of competition law and its various 
components, such as the laws governing restrictive trade practices and dominance.  Given 
the difficulty of saying anything useful about the laws of 102 countries, we have limited 
ourselves to regional comparisons.  The regional comparisons suggest that for large 
                                                 
38 McChesney, supra note 4, at 255-270. 
39 On the problems generated by using instruments that are weak explanatory variables for the endogenous 
variables see John Bound et al., Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation when the Correlation 
Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variables is Weak, 90 J. OF THE AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 443 (1995). 
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enterprises “antitrust risk” – the risk of being found in violation of some competition law 
provision – is substantially higher in the European Union than anywhere else. 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the impact of the law’s scope suggest that it has a 
positive impact on perceived competitive intensity.  However, these estimates have to be 
regarded with suspicion as statements about the impact of the law on the real intensity of 
competition.  Moreover, instrumental variable estimates reported here, although 
preliminary, fail to show a significant impact for competition law. 
 
There are many questions that could not be addressed within the scope of this paper.   For 
example, does the scope of competition law have a positive impact on a nation’s wealth?  
Does the scope of a country’s merger law have a substantial impact on the frequency of 
merger activity within the country?  In addition, the results here suggest that the key 
empirical challenge going forward is obtaining estimates of the impact of competition 












Competition Intensity Regressions, Year 2003 
Notes: 1. *** for variables that are at 5% significance level are italic, ** for those at 10% significance level. 
           2. Absolute values of t-statistics appear in below coefficient estimates    
Dependent variable: 
Competition Intensity 






















































































































Competition Agency    .157 
(.93) 
  .352** 
(1.78) 
Enforcement Budget ÷ 
GDP 
    19.99 
(1.43) 
  









































Adj R-squared .46 .45 .40 .46 .29 .50 .52 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000 0.0000 




Competition Intensity Regressions, Year 2004 
Notes: *** for variables that are at 5% significance level are italic, ** for those at 10% significance level. 
Dependent variable: 
Competition Intensity 

























































































   .034*** 
(3.02) 










Enforcement Budget ÷ 
GDP 
    9.87 
(.74) 
 
Africa      -.644*** 
(3.05) 




     --- 
Caribbean      .009 
(.03) 
Non-EU Europe      -.932*** 
(3.84) 
EU Europe      -.406 
(1.90) 
North America      --- 





     -.457** 
(1.86) 
Adj R-squared .43 .45 .42 .42 .50 .54 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 
N observations 91 90 36 90 29 90 
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Table 4 









































            
         
 
             Notes: *** for variables that are at 5% significance level are italic, ** for those at 10% significance level. 
Dependent variable: 
Log PPP 























































































Competition Agency   .331 
(.50) 
 
Enforcement Budget ÷ 
GDP 
    
Africa    1.370** 
(1.70) 




   -2.347 
(1.20) 
Caribbean    -1.059 
(.87) 
Non-EU Europe    .016 
(.02) 
EU Europe    -1.496 
(1.65) 
North America    -2.084 
(.86) 





   -1.647 
(1.47) 
Adj R-squared .17 .12 .13 .23 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.2080 0.0002 0.0000 
N observations 145 83 150 145 
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Table 5 








































           
        
 
               Notes: *** for variables that are at 5% significance level are italic, ** for those at 10% significance level. 
Dependent variable: 
Log PPP 

















































































Average Wage  -.006 
(.24) 
  
Competition Agency   -.026 
(.04) 
 
Enforcement Budget ÷ 
GDP 
    
Africa    1.360** 
(1.58) 




   --- 
Caribbean    -1.257 
(.83) 
Non-EU Europe    .088 
(.08) 
EU Europe    -1.682** 
(1.70) 
North America    --- 





   -1.890 
(1.55) 
Adj R-squared .15 -.06 .11 .21 
Prob > F 0.0002 0.6719 0.0020 0.0001 




Competition Intensity Regressions Using Components of Competition Law, Years 2003 and 2004 
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  .128 
(.76) 
   -.014 
(.08) 
Adj R-squared .46  .46  .49  .45 
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 




PPP Regressions Using Components of Competition Law, Years 2003 and 2004 
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  .336 
(.50) 
   -.033 
(.05) 
Adj R-squared .16  .12  .14  .11 
Prob > F 0.0001  0.0010  0.0013  0.0035 




























 Notes: 1.Columns 1 and 3 use legal tradition instruments only 
            2.Columns 2 and 4 use legal tradition instruments plus the regional 
















           


















































































Adj R-squared .40 .37 .33 .21 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
N observations 78 78 89 89 
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   Appendix 
Table A1: New Zealand 
Governed by: Commerce Act of 1986 last amended (hereinafter referred to as 
“Commerce Act”)40 
 
Category Subcategory Score Comment 
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 Article 4 of the Commerce Act says that it applies to 
any action that has an effect in New Zealand 
Remedies Fines 1 Article 80 allows the Commission to impose fines for 
violations to the Act. 
 Prison sentences 0  
 Divestitures 1 Article 85 says that the court may order divestiture of 
assets or shares for violations of Article 47. 
Private 
Enforcement 
3rd party initiation 0  
 Remedies available to 
3rd parties 
0  





Voluntary 1 Article 66 allows people to obtain clearance of 
proposed mergers. 
 Mandatory 0  
 Pre-merger 2 Clearance can be obtained until the merger is 
completed. 
 Post-merger 0  
Merger 
Assessment 
Dominance 0  
 Restriction of 
competition 
1 Article 47 prohibits mergers that are likely to 
substantially lessen competition in the market. 
 Public interest (Pro 
Defendant) 
1 Article 67 allows the Commission to give clearance 
for a merger that has benefits to the public that 
outweigh the detriments to competition. 
 Public interest (Pro 
Authority) 
0  
 Other 0  
 Efficiency 0  
Dominance Limits access 1 Article 40 prohibits withholding the supply of goods. 
 Abusive acts 1 Article 36(1) prohibits the abuse of market power. 
 Price Setting 0  
 Discriminatory pricing 0  
 Resale price 
maintenance 
1 Article 37 prohibits resale price maintenance. 
 Obstacles to entry 1 Article 36(2) prohibits restricting entry into the market 
by use of market power. 
 Efficiency Defense 1 Article 3A says that the Commission is to take into 
                                                 
40 See Statutes of New Zealand, New Zealand Parliamentary Council Office, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=pal_statutes. 
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account any positive effects on efficiency that are 




Price fixing 1 Article 30 prohibits price fixing. 
 Tying 0  
 Market Division 0  
 Output restraint 1 Article 29(1)(b) prohibits agreements that limit the 
supply of goods to a class of persons 
 Market sharing 1 Article 27 prohibits agreements that have the effect or 
purpose of lessening competition 
 Eliminating 
competitors 
1 Article 27(1) prohibits acts or agreements that have 
the purpose of reducing competition 
 Collusive 
tendering/bid-rigging 
1 Article 27 prohibits understandings that have the 
effect of reducing competition 
 Supply refusal 1 Article 29 prohibits group boycotts. 
 Efficiency Defense 1 Article 3A says that the Commission is to take into 
account any positive effects on efficiency that are 




Table A2: Belgium (national law) 
 
Governed by: Law on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991, 
amended by Royal Decree of 14 June 1999 (herein after referred to as Competition 
Act).41 
 
Category Subcategory Score Comment 
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 The Competition Act can be applied to anything that 
has an effect on the Belgian market. 
Remedies Fines 1 Articles 36, 37, 38, and 40 allow levying fines for 
certain violations. 
 Prison sentences 1 Article 44 allows for prison sentences for criminal 
violations. 
 Divestitures 0  
Private 
Enforcement 
3rd party initiation 0  
 Remedies available to 
3rd parties 
0 Nothing saying that damaged 3rd parties cannot file a 
private tort claim but it is not provided for 
 3rd party rights in 
proceedings 
1 Article 32(2) says that 3rd parties have the right to be 




Voluntary 0  
 Mandatory 3 Article 10(1) says the concentrations shall be subject 
to the prior consent of the Competition Council. 
 Pre-merger 2 Article 10(1) says the concentrations shall be subject 
to the prior consent of the Competition Council. 
 Post-merger 0  
Merger 
Assessment 
Dominance 1 Article 10(2)(b) says that the council must take into 
account, the market position of the companies. 
 Restriction of 
competition 
1 Article 10(2)(a) says that the council is to take into 
consideration the necessity of maintaining effective 
competition.  
 Public interest (Pro D) 1 Article 10(6) says that if the public interest justifies it, 
the Council may permit a concentration which would 
be otherwise impermissible.   
 Public interest (Pro 
Authority) 
0  
 Other 0  
 Efficiency 1 Article 10(2)(b) requires looking at the effects such a 
merger would have on economic and technological 
progress. 
Dominance Limits access 0  
 Abusive acts 1 Article 2(1) lists several abusive acts which are 
prohibited. 
 Price Setting 1 Article 3(a) prohibits dominant companies from 
imposing unfair prices. 
                                                 
41 Competition Law in the EU at 795. 
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 Discriminatory pricing 1 Article 3(c) prohibits applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions. 
 Resale price 
maintenance 
0  
 Obstacles to entry 0  
 Efficiency Defense 0  
Restrictive 
Trade Practices 
Price fixing 1 Article 2(1)(a) of the Competition Act prohibits 
directly or indirectly fixing prices by individual 
companies or cartels. 
 Tying 1 Article 2(1)(e) and Article 3(d) prohibit tying. 
 Market Division 1 Article 2(1)(b) prohibits limiting or controlling 
production, markets or investment. 
 Output restraint 1 Article 2(1)(b) prohibits limiting production, markets, 
development, and investment by individual companies 
or cartels. 







 Supply refusal 1 Article 2(1)(b) prohibits limiting production, markets, 
development, and investment by individual companies 
or cartels. 
 Efficiency Defense 1 Article 2(3) exempts agreements from the Article 2(1) 
prohibitions if they contribute to improving 
production or distribution of goods or promote 
technical or economic progress. 
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Table A3: Belgium (EU law) 
 
Governed by: Law on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991, 
amended by Royal Decree of 14 June 1999 (herein after referred to as Competition 
Act).42 
 
Category Subcategory Score Comment 
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 The Competition Act can be applied to anything that 
has an effect on the Belgian market. 
Remedies Fines 1 Articles 36, 37, 38, and 40 allow levying fines for 
certain violations. 
 Prison sentences 1 Article 44 allows for prison sentences for criminal 
violations. 




3rd party initiation 0  
 Remedies available to 
3rd parties 
0 Nothing saying that damaged 3rd parties cannot file a 
private tort claim but it is not provided for 
 3rd party rights in 
proceedings 
1 Article 32(2) says that 3rd parties have the right to be 




Voluntary 0  
 Mandatory 3  Article 7(1) of CR 139/2004 requires notification43 
 Pre-merger 2 Article 7(1) of 139/2004 requires pre-clearance 
 Post-merger 0  
Merger 
Assessment 
Dominance 1 Article 2(1) of CR 139/2004 considers dominance 
 Restriction of 
competition 
1 Article 2(1)(a) of CR 139/2004 considers effect on 
competition in the market 
 Public interest (Pro D) 1 Article 2(1)(b) of CR 139/2004 considers the 
development of technical and economic progress 
 Public interest (Pro 
Authority) 
1 Article 2(1)(b) of CR 139/2004 considers the interests 
of intermediate and ultimate consumers 
 Other 0  
 Efficiency 1 Article 2(4) of CR 139/2004 allows an efficiency 
defense 
Dominance Limits access 1 Article 82(b) prohibits limiting access 
 Abusive acts 1 Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position 
 Price Setting 1 Article 82(a) prohibits price setting 
 Discriminatory pricing 1 Articles 81(1)(d), 82(c) prohibit discriminatory 
conditions 
                                                 
42 Id. at 795. 
43 The new merger notification guidelines implemented by Council Regulation 139/2004 give undertakings 
the ability to request exemption from notification requirements.  However, because a formal request must 
be submitted and approved in order to gain exemption, the new notification guidelines are encoded as 
requiring mandatory pre-merger notification. 
 55
 Resale price 
maintenance 
1 Article 81 prohibits minimum resale price 
restrictions44 
 Obstacles to entry 1 Article 82 prohibits anti-competitive pricing 
schemes45 
 Efficiency Defense 0  
Restrictive 
Trade Practices 
Price fixing 1 Article 81(1)(a) prohibits price fixing 
 Tying 1 Articles 81(1)(e), 82(d) prohibit tying 
 Market Division 1 Article 81 prohibits customer allocation clauses46 
 Output restraint 1 Article 81(1)(b) prohibits limiting production 
 Market sharing 1 Article 81(1)(c) prohibits market sharing 
 Eliminating 
competitors 
1 Article 81(1) prohibits agreements that have the 
purpose or effect of eliminating competition 
 Collusive 
tendering/bid-rigging 
1 Article 81 prohibits bid-rigging 
 Supply refusal 1 Article 81(1)(b) prohibits supply refusal 
 Efficiency Defense 1 Article 81(3) allows an efficiency defense  
 
                                                 
44 EC Competition Law, at 97. 
45 Id. at 283. 
46 Id. at 97. 
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Appendix Table A4: List of Countries and Scores 












RTP Dom Merger Remedies
Albania 19 1 0 0 0 4 5 4 2
Algeria 15 0 0 0 1 4 4 6 1
Argentina 21 0 0 0 0 8 5 6 1
Armenia 16 0 0 1 0 4 4 5 2
Australia 25 1 1 1 1 8 6 4 3
Austria 18 1 0 0 1 5 4 4 2
Azerbaijan 20 0 0 0 0 6 5 5 2
Barbados 25 1 1 1 0 6 6 7 3
Bangladesh 14 1 0 1 0 6 1 5 2
Belarus 25 0 1 0 0 8 5 6 2
Belgium 19 1 0 1 1 6 3 6 2
Bolivia 11 0 0 1 1 4 4 2 1
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17 1 1 1 1 5 4 6 1
Brazil 20 0 0 1 0 6 6 4 1
Bulgaria 17 1 0 0 0 4 4 6 1
Burkina Faso 15 1 1 0 0 5 5 0 2
Cameroon 17 1 1 1 1 4 3 6 2
Canada 18 1 1 1 0 5 4 5 3
Chile 10 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 2
China 9 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 1
Colombia 12 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 1
Costa Rica 19 0 0 0 0 6 4 5 2
Cote d'Ivoire 12 1 1 0 0 5 3 2 2
Croatia 19 1 0 1 1 5 4 6 1
Cyprus 21 1 0 1 1 4 4 7 2
Czech Republic 19 1 0 0 1 6 5 6 1
Denmark 21 1 0 0 0 5 5 6 1
Dominican Republic 7 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 2
El Salvador 10 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 2
Estonia 21 1 0 0 1 6 4 6 2
Faroe Island 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1
Finland 20 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 1
France 18 1 1 0 0 7 4 2 2
Georgia 16 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 1
Germany 19 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 1
Greece 20 1 0 1 1 4 5 7 1
Guatemala 5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Hungary 24 1 0 0 0 8 5 6 2
Iceland 18 1 0 0 0 5 5 5 2
India 22 1 0 1 0 6 5 4 3
Indonesia 23 0 0 0 0 8 6 5 2
 57
Ireland 18 1 0 0 0 4 4 4 2
Israel 16 1 0 0 0 3 3 6 3
Italy 19 1 0 0 0 5 5 6 1
Jamaica 19 1 1 0 0 7 6 1 2
Japan 16 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 3
Jordan 22 0 0 1 0 6 6 6 1
Kazakhstan 22 0 0 0 0 6 5 6 2
Kenya 18 0 0 1 0 6 1 7 2
Korea 24 1 0 1 0 8 6 5 2
Kyrgzstan 24 1 1 1 1 7 5 6 3
Lao PDR 12 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1
Latvia 20 1 0 0 0 6 4 6 1
Lithuania 21 0 0 0 0 5 4 6 2
Luxemburg 10 1 0 0 0 4 4 0 1
Macedonia 17 1 0 0 1 2 4 6 1
Malawi 25 0 0 1 1 8 5 7 2
Mali 13 0 0 0 0 4 6 0 1
Malta 17 1 0 0 0 4 4 6 1
Mauritius  13 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 2
Mexico 23 1 1 1 0 8 5 5 2
Moldova 22 0 0 0 0 7 5 5 2
Mongolia 16 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 1
Morocco 17 1 1 0 0 3 4 7 2
Namibia  21 1 1 1 1 5 5 7 2
Netherlands 21 1 1 0 0 4 5 7 1
New Zealand 16 1 1 0 1 6 4 3 2
Nigeria 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3
Norway 20 1 0 0 0 5 5 5 2
Pakistan 14 1 0 1 0 6 1 5 2
Panama 20 1 1 0 0 8 4 5 1
Papua New Guinea 13 1 1 0 1 4 3 2 2
Paraguay 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Peru 13 0 0 0 0 7 3 0 1
Philippines 7 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
Poland 19 1 0 0 0 6 4 6 1
Portugal 21 1 0 0 0 5 5 7 2
Romania 22 1 0 1 1 7 4 6 3
Russian Federation 21 1 1 0 0 5 5 5 3
Senegal 15 0 0 0 0 8 6 0 1
Slovak Republic 19 1 0 0 0 5 4 5 1
Slovenia 20 1 0 0 0 5 4 7 1
South Africa 20 1 1 1 1 3 5 6 3
Spain 23 1 0 1 1 6 5 6 2
 58
Sri Lanka 7 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 3
Sweden 22 1 0 0 1 6 5 6 1
Switzerland 21 1 1 0 1 4 5 7 1
Taiwan 22 1 1 1 0 7 4 5 3
Tajikistan 20 0 0 0 0 7 5 5 2
Tanzania 14 1 1 1 1 4 1 6 1
Thailand 20 1 0 0 0 7 3 6 2
Tunisia 13 1 1 1 0 4 3 4 2
Turkey 20 1 0 0 0 6 5 5 1
Ukraine 23 1 0 0 1 6 5 6 2
United Kingdom 23 1 1 1 0 7 6 4 2
United States 25 1 1 1 0 8 5 6 3
Uruguay 8 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 1
Uzbekistan 23 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 2
Venezuela 13 1 0 0 0 5 4 2 1
Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) 
11 1 0 0 0 4 4 0 2
Zambia 17 0 0 0 0 5 4 5 2
Zimbabwe 15 0 0 1 0 2 2 6 2
Averages 17.451 0.618 0.284 0.333 0.265 5.020 4.039 4.441 1.745




























Appendix Table A5: Ranking Countries by Scope Index 
Country (as of 2004) Score Country (as of 2004) Score Country (as of 2004) Score 
Australia 25 Greece 20 Israel 16 
Barbados 25 Latvia 20 Japan 16 
Belarus 25 Norway 20 Mongolia 16 
Malawi 25 Panama 20 New Zealand 16 
United States 25 Slovenia 20 Algeria 15 
Hungary 24 South Africa 20 Burkina Faso 15 
Korea 24 Tajikistan 20 Senegal 15 
Kyrgzstan 24 Thailand 20 Zimbabwe 15 
Indonesia 23 Turkey 20 Bangladesh 14 
Mexico 23 Albania 19 Pakistan 14 
Spain 23 Belgium 19 Tanzania 14 
Ukraine 23 Costa Rica 19 Mali 13 
United Kingdom 23 Croatia 19 Mauritius  13 
Uzbekistan 23 Czech Republic 19 Papua New Guinea 13 
India 22 Germany 19 Peru 13 
Jordan 22 Italy 19 Tunisia 13 
Kazakhstan 22 Jamaica 19 Venezuela 13 
Moldova 22 Poland 19 Colombia 12 
Romania 22 Slovak Republic 19 Cote d'Ivoire 12 
Sweden 22 Austria 18 Lao PDR 12 
Taiwan 22 Canada 18 Bolivia 11 
Argentina 21 France 18 Yugoslavia (Serbia) 11 
Cyprus 21 Iceland 18 Chile 10 
Denmark 21 Ireland 18 El Salvador 10 
Estonia 21 Kenya 18 Luxemburg 10 
Lithuania 21 Bosnia-Herzegovina 17 Nigeria 10 
Namibia  21 Bulgaria 17 China 9 
Netherlands 21 Cameroon 17 Uruguay 8 
Portugal 21 Macedonia 17 Dominican Republic 7 
Russian Federation 21 Malta 17 Philippines 7 
Switzerland 21 Morocco 17 Sri Lanka 7 
Azerbaijan 20 Zambia 17 Faroe Island 5 
Brazil 20 Armenia 16 Guatemala 5 




Appendix: Index Definitions 
 
Total Index Score (Minimum possible score 0 – Maximum 30) 
 
The total index score is simply the sum of the scores for each category (e.g. scope, 
remedies, private enforcement, etc).  Defenses and pro-defendant elements do not 





Extraterritoriality: The applicable law or Act applies to foreign companies and citizens as 




Fines: The law allows fines for violations of the applicable Act. 
 
Prison Sentences: The law includes criminal violations which are punishable by 
imprisonment. 
 
Divestitures: The law allows the selling of assets or division of the company in response 
to certain violations.48 
 
Private Enforcement (0-3) 
 
Third Party Initiation: Third parties (usually those damaged by the violations) can file 
private lawsuits or initiate an investigation or hearing by the applicable Commission or 
Council.49 
 
Remedies Available to Third Parties: Remedies for damaged third parties are provided 
for in the Act.50 
                                                 
47 For example, “This Act shall also apply to all economic activities of [foreign companies], if their actions 
have a substantial effect on the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . .”  The Act on Competition, art. 2 
(2005) (Bosn. & Herz.) (available http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba/en/laws/low_on_competition_new.pdf) 
[hereinafter Bosnia Competition Act]. 
48 For example, “[T]he [competition council] may require . . . the separation or divestiture of the merged 
undertakings or assets . . . in order to restore effective competition.”  Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition 
of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices, art. 31 (2005) (Hung.) (available 
http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2005nov1_a.pdf) [hereinafter Hungary Competition Act].  
49 For example, “Any person who is aggrieved in consequence of any [prohibited practice] shall have a 
right of action under this subsection for relief . . . .”  Competition Act, §6 (2002) (Ir.) (available 
http://www.tca.ie/). 
50 For example, “A market participant who deliberately or by carelessness violates the provisions . . . of this 
Law shall cover the losses which . . . have been caused to another market participant or party to a contract.”  




Third Party Rights in Proceedings: Third parties have access to evidence and/or can 
testify or otherwise participate in proceedings.51 
 
Merger Notification (0-5)52 
 
Voluntary: Companies are encouraged, but not required, to notify the applicable 
Commission or Council of an intended merger.53 
 
Mandatory: Companies fitting particular criteria are required to notify the applicable 
Commission or Council of any intended merger. This gets a score of 3 if fulfilled in order 
to represent the comparative severity of a mandatory distinction as compared with a 
voluntary scheme.54 
 
Pre-Merger: The Commission must be notified before the merger occurs (includes 
countries where the notification happens somewhat simultaneously with the merger). 
This gets a score of 2 if fulfilled.55 
 
Post-Merger: The Commission is notified after the merger (and then often has the power 
to invalidate the completed merger).56 
 
Merger Assessment (0-4) 
                                                 
51 For example, “Persons who participate in a case shall have the right: to familiarize themselves with the 
materials of the case . . . ; to provide evidence, to submit applications, verbal and written explanations . . .” 
Law of Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, art. 39-40 (2001) (Ukr.) (available 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/europe/Ukraine/LEGISLATION.pdf). 
52 The scoring in this area breaks from a basic dummy variable scheme in order to preserve accurate 
ordering of the relative severity of different Merger Notification regimes.  Under this scoring scheme, a 
Mandatory Pre-Merger regime receives a 5, a Mandatory Post-Merger regime receives a 4, a Voluntary 
Pre-Merger regime receives a 3, a Voluntary Post-Merger regime receives a 2, a Voluntary regime that 
makes no mention of a time requirement is assumed to be “Post-Merger” and therefore receives a 2, and a 
regime that makes no mention of a notification requirement receives a 0.  For construction of the Scope 
Index, each score was reduced by 1. 
53 For example, “[A]ny person or enterprise, who or which proposes to enter into a combination, may, at his 
or its option, give notice to the commission . . . disclosing the details of the proposed combination[.]”  The 
Competition Act, art. 6(2) (2002) (India) (available http://www.competition-commission-
india.nic.in/Act/competition_act2002.pdf). 
54 For example, “Where a merger is proposed each of the undertakings involved must notify the 
Commission of the proposal in the prescribed manner.”  Competition Act, No. 92, art. 44(1) (2003) 
(Namib.) (available http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Namibia/ACT511.pdf) 
[hereinafter Namibia Competition Act]. 
55 For example, “A business operator shall not carry out a business merger . . . unless the Commission’s 
consent is obtained.”  Competition Act, B.E. 2542, §26 (1999) (Thail.) (available 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/asia/Bangkok/Bankok%20Act.pdf). 
56 For example, “A party to a [regulated] merger shall notify the Commission of the proposed merger 
within 30 days of the conclusion of the merger agreement between the merging parties; or the acquisition 
by any one of the parties to that merger of a controlling interest in another.” Zimbabwe Amended 





Dominance: The Commission or Council takes into consideration the dominant position 
or market share that the company will have if the merger occurs.57 
 
Restriction of Competition: The Commission or Council considers the merger in light of 
maintaining effective competition, the potential effects on the structure of the market, and 
possible barriers to entry.58 
 
Public Interest (Pro D): The Commission or Council considers whether an otherwise 
impermissible merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest and/or will have 
benefits or advantages to the consumers.59 
 
Public Interest (Pro Authority): The Commission or Council has the power to prohibit a 
merger if they are concerned it runs contrary to public interests such as national 
security.60 
 
Other: The Commission or Council considers other issues such as international 
competitiveness, effects on employment markets, and promoting minority ownership.61 
 
Efficiency Defense: The Commission or Council may allow an otherwise impermissible 




                                                 
57 For example, “A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position in the affected markets . 
. . shall be declared [illegal].”  Law to Provide for the Control of Concentrations between Enterprises for 
the Purposes of Protection of Effective Competition, No. 22(l), art. 10 (1999) (Cyprus) (available 
http://www.competition.gov.cy/competition/competition.nsf/All/5790CF902F3E4AA5C2256F01003CF9A
7/$file/concentration.pdf?OpenElement) [hereinafter Cyrus Competition Law]. 
58 For example, “The Authority may refuse to approve a merger or acquisition if it is satisfied that the 
merger or acquisition would substantially lessen competition in Jersey or any part of Jersey.” Competition 
(Jersey) Law 2005, art. 22(4) (available http://www.jcra.je/pdf/051101%20Competition-Jersey-Law--
2005.pdf). 
59 For example, “[A decision to make a certain practice illegal] may not be applied to . . . concentrations 
that contribute to the improvement of production or distribution of goods and services or the promotion of 
technical or economic progress [while] allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit . . . .”  
Bosnia Competition Act, art. 7. 
60 For example, “The Commission shall declare a concentration as compatible or incompatible with the 
requirements of the competitive market after taking into account . . . the interests of intermediate and final 
consumers . . . .”  Cyprus Competition Law, art. 12. 
61 For example, “The Commission may base its determination of a proposed merger on any criteria which it 
considers relevant [including] the extent to which the proposed merger would be likely to affect the ability 
of small undertakings, in particular small undertakings owned or controlled by historically disadvantaged 
persons, to gain access to or to be competitive in any market[.]”  Namibia Competition Act, art. 47(2)(f). 
62 For example, “[The Commission may consider] any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed 
merger relating to research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, efficient 
distribution of goods or provision of services and access to markets.”  Namibia Competition Act, art 
47(2)(h). 
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Limits Access: A single dominant firm may not limit the supply of goods to the market or 
in other ways restrict access to the market by consumers or competitors.63 
 
Abusive Acts: The Act lists or otherwise indicates acts that would constitute an 
impermissible abuse of a dominant position.64 
 
Price Setting: It is impermissible for a single firm to arbitrarily or unfairly set the price of 
a good by taking advantage of its dominant position.65 
 
Discriminatory Pricing: A single dominant firm may not impose different prices for the 
same goods or services for different customers.66 
 
Resale Price Maintenance: The Act does not allow single firms to set the price at which 
its customers will ultimately sell their product to consumers.67 
 
Obstacles to Entry: A dominant firm is prohibited from imposing various restrictions or 
coercive practices that make it very difficult for competitors to enter the market or 
increase their market share.68 
 
Efficiency Defense: An otherwise impermissible act is excused if it substantially 
contributes to economic efficiency or to the public good.69 
 
Restrictive Trade Practices (0-8) 
 
Price Fixing: A cartel or group of companies is not allowed to attempt to set the price for 
their product in the market.70 
 
Tying: A group of companies is not allowed to condition contracts on buying additional 
products that are not directly connected to the product that is the subject of the contract.71 
                                                 
63 For example, “It shall be prohibited . . . to limit production, distribution or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers[.]”  Hungary Competition Act, art. 21. 
64 For example, “It shall be prohibited to abuse a dominant position . . . .”  Id. 
65 For example, “It shall be prohibited . . . to set unfair purchase or selling prices . . . .”  Id. 
66 For example, “It shall be prohibited . . . in the case of transactions which are equivalent in terms of their 
value or character to discriminate, without justification, against trading parties including in relation to the 
application of prices, periods of payment, [etc.]”  Id. 
67 For example, “[Illegal acts include] any agreement, decision, or concerted practice which . . . involves a 
practice of minimum resale price maintenance[.]” Namibia Competition Act, art. 23(3)(d). 
68 For example, “[A dominant Enterprise] is prohibited from abusing this Dominant Position in order to 
prevent, limit, or weaken competition including . . . [performing an] activity or action which leads to setting 
barriers of entry of other Enterprises to the market . . . .”  The Competition Law, No. 33, art. 6(b) (2004) 
(Jordan) (available 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mergerjordanlaw.pdf). 
69 For example, “The Commission may . . . grant an exemption for [an] agreement [if] . . . the agreement 
results or is likely to result in benefits to the public [such as] by contributing to greater efficiency in 
production or distribution; by promoting technical or economic progress [etc.]”  The Fair Competition Act, 
art. 12 (2003) (Tanz.) (available http://www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/8-2003-2003.pdf). 
70 For example, “[Agreements involving] the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or other 
business terms and conditions [are prohibited.]”  Hungary Competition Act, art. 11.  
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Market Division: A group of companies cannot agree to divide or allocate the market by a 
particular geographic, demographic, price-defined, or otherwise-defined characteristic.72 
 
Output Restraint: A group of companies is not allowed to agree to limit the overall rate of 
production or amount of products made available to the market.73 
 
Market Sharing: A group of companies cannot agree to share a certain market by not 
competing with each other for business or customers.74 
 
Eliminating Competitors: The law prohibits acts by a group of companies that have the 
purpose and/or effect of reducing the amount of competition in the market.75 
 
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging: It is illegal for a group of firms to agree not to bid at 
market price for a certain product in order to manipulate the market price of that 
product.76 
 
Supply Refusal: A group of companies cannot agree not to sell their products to certain 
other companies or groups of companies for arbitrary reasons.77 
 
Efficiency Defense: An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes 







                                                                                                                                                 
71 For example, “[M]aking the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance of obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage do not belong to the subject of such contracts [is 
prohibited.]”  Id. 
72 For example, “Prohibited are all agreements between economic subjects, associations and concerted 
practices relating to . . . the division of markets or sources of supply of goods and services[.]” Bosnia 
Competition Act, art. 4(c). 
73 For example, “Agreements or concerted practices [relating to] the limitation or control of production, 
distribution, technical development or investment [are prohibited.]” Hungary Competition Act, art. 21.  
74 For example, “Agreements or concerted practices [relating to] the allocation of markets, exclusion from 
sales, or restriction of the choice of marketing possibilities [are prohibited.]”  Id. 
75 For example, “Agreements or concerted practices between undertakings . . . which have as their object or 
potential or actual effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, shall be prohibited.”  Id. 
76 For example, “[T]he collusion of competitors during the bidding process [is prohibited.]”  Hungarian 
Competition Act, art. 21 (2004) (Hung.) (available 
http://www.gvh.hu/data/pdf/jogi_hatter_mj_tpvt_2003aug1_a.pdf). 
77 For example, “[C]oncerted refusals to supply goods or services to potential purchasers [are prohibited.]”  
Malawi Competition and Fair Trading Bill, §33(3)(f) (1998) (Malawi) (available 
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/Laws/malawi.pdf). 
78 See supra note 25. 
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Efficiency Defense: An otherwise impermissible practice may be allowed if it contributes 







                                                 
78 See supra note 25. 
